Filling a critical gap, or just wasting time?
Track Two diplomacy and regional security in the Middle East

Many followers of Middle East affairs will be familiar with the term "Track Two Diplomacy", particularly in dialogues between Israelis and Palestinians. However, there is also another, less well-known, field of Track Two activity under way in the absence of an official regional dialogue on security issues and arms control. This paper will review the phenomenon of Track Two on regional security issues in the Middle East and analyse the difficult question of how to measure the success, or even impact, of such processes.

The paper begins with a brief analysis of Track Two diplomacy, which outlines the differences between traditional Track Two (aimed at bilateral dispute resolution) and regional security dialogues. The paper then comments on the only official regional security process in the region, the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group process, and situates regional security Track Two in relation to it. Briefly referencing the main Track Two projects on security issues under way in the region (which are described elsewhere), the paper analyses how these dialogues make their impact. The paper concludes with thoughts on where Middle East regional security Track Two may be going.

Track Two diplomacy

The term "Track Two Diplomacy" was coined in 1981 by Joseph Montville. Montville used the term to denote the growing number of unofficial dialogues taking place with respect to conflict resolution. He defined Track Two as being:

…unofficial, informal interaction among members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict.

Depending on how one defines it, however, Track Two had been around since at least before the First World War in the form of the various "peace societies" that had pressed for disarmament. There had also been an institutionalized form of what we would now call Track Two for many years in the Asia-Pacific region.

In the form that we presently recognize it (quiet, unofficial dialogues to help resolve conflicts), Track Two first arose in the 1960s. John Burton and colleagues at University College London convened
a process to help resolve a dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. Since then, an active "scholar–practitioner" community has arisen. In the Middle East, an ongoing set of Track Two dialogues between Israelis and Palestinians has been a key, if quiet, feature of regional diplomacy.

The field is not without critics. Some practitioners of official diplomacy are concerned that "amateurs" should not engage in such activities lest they damage the diplomatic process. Some scholars question whether Track Two can claim to be a discipline, and argue that poor standards of analysis into what makes such interventions successful have led to a field which lacks academic credibility and official legitimacy. Supporters of Track Two note that serious study of the field is under way, to the extent that the need which many of the processes have for confidentiality allows. They question whether the calls of the social scientists for academic experiments to determine the efficacy of Track Two can ever be achieved in real world circumstances.

For the purposes of this paper two issues are worth noting. The first is that Track Two finds itself between different traditions of social science as regards international relations. The "realist" school tends to favour explanations of international affairs that stress interest-based bargaining, the competition for power between states and zero-sum games. Social-psychological and constructivist theories tend to stress interpersonal relations, community-building and the development of norms. While neither realism nor constructivism is as definitive as presented here, most Track Two is more comfortable in the latter tradition. Track Two tends to stress interpersonal dynamics and social-psychological techniques. In a region where realism is much in evidence, such as the Middle East, gaining a foothold for new approaches is difficult.

A second point is that the great bulk of research and writing on Track Two is about resolving specific conflicts between (usually) two parties. Thus, most of the terminological and analytical concepts with which we assess Track Two are rooted in the dynamics and traditions of various schools of "conflict resolution". While probably inevitable, this does raise questions as to how much of this literature is relevant to Track Two aimed at developing new approaches to regional security.

The official regional security process: ACRS

From 1991 to 1995, the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (ACRS) met as one of the five multilateral groups of the Middle East peace process. ACRS produced significant progress on confidence-building measures and the beginnings of a conceptual dialogue on regional security. ACRS stalled on two issues: the question of the relationship between the bilateral track of the peace process and the multilateral track (which was not a problem unique to ACRS, as the other four multilateral working groups also foundered on it); and the issue of whether and how to capture Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity within the ACRS process—an issue unique to ACRS.

ACRS suffered from a number of systemic flaws. Two stand out. As a working group of the peace process, ACRS promoted a vision of Middle East regional security squarely within the Arab–Israeli dynamic. While Arab–Israeli peace is undoubtedly an important aspect of regional security, it is not the only one and the structure of ACRS overplayed this issue. Second, ACRS excluded several states such as Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Syria.

The relationship between ACRS and Track Two has evolved. Some of the first Track Two activities supported and complemented ACRS by providing studies to develop the ACRS agenda and regional officials' understanding of the issues they would face. Track Two was also meant to stimulate the creation of a community of experts across the Middle East, at both the official and academic levels.
who could support an intensive and ongoing regional arms control process.\textsuperscript{19} As ACRS went into abeyance, some in the region saw Track Two as a way to keep a semi-official process going during what was supposed to be a temporary lull, though some of the most successful of such activities took on a life of their own when it became apparent that ACRS was not going to restart.\textsuperscript{20}

**Track Two and regional security in the Middle East: projects and objectives**

Track Two on regional security in the Middle East has thus now moved beyond the ACRS years and come into its own. The main groups currently active are:\textsuperscript{21}

- the Consortium of Middle Eastern research institutes, sponsored by Canada and Denmark, which is looking at models for a cooperative regional security system;
- the Center for Middle East Development (CMED) at the University of California, Los Angeles, which hosts dialogues on various themes relating to regional cooperation;
- the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) meetings on Gulf security;
- the Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National Laboratory in the United States (with a regional office in Jordan), which is doing studies with regional experts on technical aspects of arms control, especially on verification issues;
- Gulf 2000, resident at Columbia University in New York, which runs a highly respected e-mail discussion forum and has hosted meetings on Persian Gulf issues;
- the Stanley Foundation, based in Iowa, also active on Persian Gulf security;
- the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, which run specific meetings on Middle East security issues;
- the Italian Landau Network–Centro Volta, which runs meetings on different issues of arms control and regional stability; and
- the ongoing work of several institutes on both sides of the Mediterranean affiliated with the European Union’s EuroMeSCo network, otherwise known as the Barcelona Process, examining cooperation across the Mediterranean.

Several other Track Two projects are now ended or are in stasis. These are:

- the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) project, a multi-year research project involving experts from across the region to examine the creation of a regional security regime in the Middle East (this project has been carried forward by the Consortium mentioned above);
- a project run from DePaul University in Illinois, which gathered a small group from Egypt, Israel and Jordan for in-depth discussions of the nuclear issue that stalled the ACRS process;
- a project on the possible creation of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) in the Gulf run by the Gulf Research Centre (GRC), based in Dubai;
- a project on bioweapons run by Search for Common Ground, which branched into cooperative work among regional countries on pandemic preparedness;
- maritime safety activities sponsored by the Canadian government; and
- meetings on various aspects of regional security and threat perceptions run by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

For the purpose of analysing the differences between these various projects, they can be separated between:
• those that take a primarily or exclusively subregional focus, concentrating on either the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean as specific areas in which a regional cooperation and security system should be developed before a region-wide system (Gulf 2000, Stanley Foundation, GRC, IISS for the Persian Gulf and the Barcelona Process for the Mediterranean);

• those that believe that a region-wide cooperation and security system should be explored, though this does not preclude the development of subregional approaches at the same time (the Consortium, CMED and SIPRI projects); and

• those that do not explore the question of regional or subregional approaches, but are more interested in exploring other issues such as confidence-building measures and arms control and security cooperation in the Middle East (UNIDIR; CMC; Search for Common Ground; DePaul University).

Of course, the distinctions are often not as clear as drawn here, and some projects look at various aspects of these questions (e.g. Pugwash and the Landau Network).

A second level that distinguishes many of the projects concerned with regional security is their orientation with regard to the question of what kind of security is sought. Most Middle East regional security projects have concentrated on “collective” and “cooperative” security, in their state-centric meanings. Collective security is often used to describe a system whereby a group of states perceives a common threat or enemy and has banded together against it. One of the more famous examples of this is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Cooperative security, in modern usage, posits that a group of states has identified a common set of issues or concerns and is establishing a set of rules of conduct or a mechanism whereby the states can come together to discuss their concerns and try to develop more predictable relations. One example of this is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the OSCE. Another is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN.

Interestingly, the two types are not mutually exclusive. In Europe, the OSCE and NATO coexist, as did the OSCE’s predecessor (the CSCE) with both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In Asia, ASEAN coexists with collective defence arrangements such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which involve certain ASEAN countries—Malaysia and Singapore—and Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. One does not therefore have to pick and choose; each type of arrangement can exist within a given space, provided the objectives are not mutually contradictory.

The importance of this issue to any understanding of Middle East regional security Track Two is that some projects in the region have been primarily focused on collective security, while others have been examining cooperative security concepts. Some of those who were most keen on a Persian Gulf system in the wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq were largely advancing the idea of a collective security arrangement between the United States and certain Gulf countries, possibly to form the backbone of an eventual broader system. Others, whether talking about the idea of a Persian Gulf first approach or a wider pan-regional structure, have been advancing the idea of a primarily cooperative regional security system.

In the case of those projects examining a regional, or subregional collective security system, the participating states would be only a certain number of regional countries and they would be banding together with the United States to resist a perceived aggressor. In the case of those Middle East Track Two projects examining a cooperative system, it is expected that a much greater number of regional countries would participate (and that the system would be open to all) and that it would not be aimed at countering a specific country so much as developing a code of conduct and associated dialogue mechanisms to give that code effect. In other words, there would be no common threat perceived by all, in the form of a specific other country, but rather a general agreement that uncertainty and lack of common standards of behaviour are the danger. Of course, as noted previously, the two kinds of systems could coexist in the Middle East, as they do elsewhere.
Roles, limitations and assessment of regional security Track Two

Trying to develop ways of understanding the role of regional security Track Two, and of measuring success, is difficult. This should not be surprising. Some of the most difficult questions in the field of analysing Track Two (even the more intensively studied bilateral dispute resolution model) are the roles and limitations of such processes, and how to assess effectiveness. This is even more the case for regional security Track Two.

Ball, Milner and Taylor, in their analysis of regional security Track Two in the Asia–Pacific region, note four possible roles on which criteria for success can be developed and judged.

- Track Two processes can serve as a mechanism for the development of policy advice to governments, particularly as regards new issues or longer-term questions. In this sense, Track Two, if accepted by regional governments, can serve as a kind of reserve of intellectual capacity.
- Track Two processes provide a "laboratory" for the development and testing of ideas. New concepts or specific proposals can be debated in an atmosphere within which governments are not committed.
- Track Two offers an alternate route to the continuation of regional security discussions where official routes are blocked. This implies a high degree of confidence in (and probably control over) Track Two.
- Track Two performs a socialization role. At the most basic level, it permits participants to get to know each other. Beyond this, it is assumed that participants develop a keener appreciation of each other's perspectives and concerns. Ultimately, they can achieve shared understandings on difficult issues.

Ball et al. note a number of limitations, some of which are specific to regional security Track Two in the Asia–Pacific. First, by developing a notion of regional Track Two that is closely linked to government, this region has developed a model whereby Track Two is often an extension of official diplomacy. While this ensures that ideas are transmitted, it can also mean that some of the problems of the official process are found in Track Two. This is a phenomenon that one scholar has called the "autonomy dilemma"; the more autonomous Track Two is of governments, the more freedom it has, but the less immediate and measurable its impact, and vice versa. For example, some ideas may not be on the agenda due to official sensitivities and there may be problems bringing all actors into the process.

A second perceived limitation of Asia–Pacific regional security Track Two is that it has, to date at any rate, largely ignored civil society. In the Asia–Pacific region a set of processes regionally referred to as "Track Three" has sprung up, largely comprised of civil society groups whose agendas are often critical of governments in such areas as human rights, and who feel themselves excluded from the semi-official Track Two.

A final limitation of this type of regional security Track Two appears to be its inability to move quickly in the face of pressing issues or a rapidly changed regional environment. This may be a function of the highly institutionalized nature of Asia–Pacific regional Track Two.

Turning to the Middle East, Kaye argues that regional security Track Two has three roles. She also posits that they usually run sequentially, a point not emphasized in the analysis of Ball and his colleagues.

- First, the "socialization" of the participating elites is a process whereby these elites are introduced, usually by Western experts, to various concepts relating to security, with much
of the work taking place in informal workshops (this is a somewhat different socialization role to that described by Ball and colleagues).

- Second, the "filtering" of externally generated policy ideas to the local environment is a process whereby the regional participants take the ideas presented during the socialization period and re-form them in ways that are relevant to their regional reality. If particularly successful, this role goes beyond straightforward reformulation of specific ideas and toward a broader reformulation of the conflict itself in ways which are more amenable to new approaches to regional security.

- Finally, the "transmission" to official policy, which involves a more formal process whereby the ideas developed in the other two roles are translated into official policies across the region. Some tangible indicators of success are lower defence budgets or arms control agreements.

Kaye notes three possible limitations of such processes: the difficulty of finding participants who have sufficient security credentials to be credible, but who are still open to new thinking; the fact that regional elites may simply be unprepared to shift from realist thinking toward cooperative security concepts (in those cases where such a shift is necessary, i.e. cooperative security projects); and that regional elites may be unprepared to accept the notion that it is in their interest to develop new approaches to regional security when a basic difference (the Arab–Israeli dispute) has not been resolved.

Writing specifically about Track Two as a vehicle to assist in the development of a Gulf WMDFZ (GWMDFZ), a final author notes four possible roles for Track Two.33

- The development of a cadre of regional experts who are conversant with the issues under discussion and with each other's views.
- The provision of a forum in which people, including officials from countries that do not recognize each other, can meet to discuss the issues.
- The development of a structured, ongoing process in which regional experts can tackle the complex issues that will arise if a WMDFZ is to be created.
- The provision of a forum for the development of ideas for a broad regional security architecture, which will be a precondition for the creation of a WMDFZ.

**Measuring success**

As discussed, it is notoriously difficult to develop firm criteria or definitions for the success of any type of Track Two diplomacy, particularly for Track Two devoted to regional security. Most indicators are rather general and include the "socialization" of elites toward new ways of thinking about security, and the development of epistemic communities capable of developing and transferring ideas into tension-prone regions. (Another possible role for Track Two would be the identification and development of a "next generation" of regional scholars and officials.)

These are worthy goals. But we are still left with the question of how to measure them. How do we "learn" from previous projects? How do we assure those funding such efforts that their money is generating positive returns? There are no easy answers. Are we to measure success by agreements achieved on the official track that are inspired by Track Two work? That may take a long time and the connection between regional security Track Two and eventual official agreements may be tenuous. Do we measure success by numbers of meetings and the political, military or academic stature of those attending? These are tangible indicators of something, but do they necessarily capture the validity of the work being done?
One indicator that can provide some evidence that the idea of Track Two on security matters is taking root in the Middle East would be the extent to which regional governments and institutions begin to support it. Such work must be led by the region rather than by outsiders if it is to have political credibility in the region. Presently, virtually all Middle East regional security Track Two is supported by outsiders, primarily foundations and governments in Canada, Europe and the United States. Beyond financial support, there is a need for greater regional leadership in project leadership and intellectual terms. One notable exception is the Gulf WMDFZ project sponsored and carried out by the Dubai-based Gulf Research Centre. In the end, however, we remain more reliant on general indicators for the worth of these projects than we might like.34

Possible future approaches for regional security Track Two in the Middle East

Both Jones and Kaye suggest, in different ways, a model of regional security Track Two in the Middle East that bears some resemblance to the Track Two that has emerged in the Asia–Pacific region. The primary reason for this is that most Middle Eastern governments are likely to be more comfortable with a Track Two process that is under their "tutelage"; it should ease concerns that these dialogues might develop in ways with which they are not comfortable. It would also tend to ensure that any results from the process would be transferred to the official level, given that a close relationship between the two levels would be a "built-in" feature of the process. That said, there is a danger that the problems which have arisen in Asia over such questions as the "autonomy dilemma" might simply be replicated and reinforced in the Middle East.

Of course, Asia and the Middle East are not the same. There is no network of regional think-tanks in the Middle East as exists in Asia; it will have to be built. At least two current projects are seeking to build such networks. The Consortium process, sponsored by Canada and Denmark, is advancing by means of a consortium of regional institutes, which are working together to host inclusive workshops on cooperative regional security themes. Another process, supported by the Near East and South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, is sponsored by the US government and has established a Regional Network of Strategic Studies Centers to undertake workshops and projects. Institutes from certain countries, such as Iran, are not invited to participate, and its membership, reflecting the NESA Center's broader mandate from the US Department of Defense, includes India, Pakistan and other countries not traditionally thought of as part of the Middle East.

Another key difference is that the Asia–Pacific model of regional security Track Two exists to support an ongoing official process of discussions on such issues, which is centred on ASEAN. With the demise of ACRS, no such official process exists in the Middle East, and even ACRS was not entirely inclusive. Regrettably, there is no sign that any official process will restart in the Middle East in the near future. Could a Track Two process be a stepping-stone to the development of an official process? Alternatively, can a regional security Track Two process exist indefinitely in the absence of such an official process, and perhaps "stand in" for it in some way over time? The answers to these questions are not yet clear. In principle, it should be possible, but some regional governments may not be prepared to accept the idea of a standing, semi-institutionalized Track Two process on regional security questions, particularly if it is perceived as an attempt to go around the issues that rendered it impossible to continue with ACRS.
Conclusion

Track Two on regional security in the Middle East may be approaching something of a crossroads. Several highly useful projects have been run, or are being run. A cadre of regional academics, military officers and other officials has taken part in these and valuable products have been developed. However, it is not entirely clear that these products have made their way into mainstream discourse around the Middle East and there is as yet no sense that a core of Middle Eastern states have emerged that regard Track Two as worthy of ongoing support. Moreover, as noted, it is unclear how long such processes can be sustained in the absence of an official process.

Expectations should be kept realistic. Long-standing regional problems are not going to be solved overnight. Even if a more institutionalized regional Track Two security process springs into being, possibly along the lines of the one that exists in Asia, only an official process on regional security can tackle many of the issues facing the Middle East. Track Two exists to encourage the development of such a process and to support it. Therefore, a tendency to insist on firm "accomplishments" from Track Two should be avoided, at least in public. But those who have sponsored Track Two in the region to date are entitled to ask when regional leaders will emerge to begin to play a greater role.

Notes

1. Middle East is intended to convey the sense meant by the term 'Middle East and North Africa' (MENA).
4. The term was first mentioned in W.D. Davidson and J.V. Montville, 1981–82, "Foreign Policy According to Freud", Foreign Policy, vol. 45, winter, but is generally attributed to Montville.


13. For a brief review of the main theories of international relations see S.M. Walt, 1998, "One World, Many Theories", Foreign Policy, spring.

14. One model of how Track Two can play a role in both is the concept of "hard" and "soft" Track Two. Soft Track Two consists of dialogues aimed at breaking down psychological barriers between groups, while hard Track Two is more aimed at solutions to differences between states. Agha et al., op. cit., pp. 3–5.


17. Syria and Lebanon opted to remain out of the multilateral process until their bilateral dispute with Israel was resolved. Iran, Iraq and Libya were not invited to participate in ACRS, although it is unlikely they would have come had they been invited as Israel was present.

18. Personal discussions with organizers of and participants in early ACRS-related Track Two projects.


20. For example, the Canadian-sponsored maritime safety activities. Personal exchange between the author and David Griffiths, a consultant on maritime security issues and former Canadian naval officer who ran the maritime CBM process for the Canadian government after the demise of ACRS.

21. See Kaye, 2007, op. cit., pp. 31–73 for a summary and analysis of the various regional security Track Two projects under way, and those that were active in the past. In the interests of full disclosure, the present author was Project Leader of the SIPRI project and is now involved in the Consortium project, which is being funded by Canada and Denmark.


23. For more on cooperative security see J. Nolan, 1994, Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution. Confusion exists because the term 'cooperative security' was employed after the First World War by President Wilson and the League of Nations in a way more akin to what we now call collective security; a group of states banding together to collectively deter and resist aggression. In this paper, the term is not used in that sense.

24. It should be noted that the OSCE and ASEAN have important social and economic functions, respectively, which go beyond narrowly defined security.


27. The fact that it is so difficult to measure outputs is one of the criticisms made by Rouhana. Others argue that precise measurements are not possible in a subjective field. For one discussion of the debate see T. Pearson d'Estree, L.A. Fast, J.N. Weiss and M.S. Jakobsen, 2001, "Changing the Debate about 'Success' in Conflict Resolution Efforts", Negotiation Journal, vol. 17, no. 2, April, pp. 101–113.


33. One interesting point, based on the reviews done of the above six authors, is that they are all talking about Track Two regional security dialogues as essentially being instruments of developing cooperative security models and are largely concerned with Track Two as a means of introducing new conceptions of security to troubled regions. There has not been an analysis on the question of whether regional security Track Two devoted to developing collective security concepts would differ significantly, and how.
Despite problems and limitations, track two diplomacy has proved an important mechanism in building regional understanding and knowledge in the arms control and regional security realm. Such diplomacy could also be applied to other issues and regions during the lengthy process of building peace among adversaries. This article critically reviews the literature on Track 2 security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific and suggests a number of possible avenues for further research. From almost a standing start, Track 2 security dialogue in this part of the world has burgeoned over the past decade and a half. Despite problems and limitations, track two diplomacy has proved an important mechanism in building regional understanding and knowledge in the arms control and regional security realm. Such diplomacy could also be applied to other issues and regions during the lengthy process of building peace among adversaries.